Abstract. Hereby we publish fi ve (previously unpublished) excerpts from Charles S. Peirce's manuscripts -one from the Prescott Book (MS 277, 1909) and four from the Logic Notebook (MS 339, October 1905-March 1906, 1909. Th ese concern the problems of classifi cation of signs.
Our selection is based on Peirce's own designations that come from the likewise unpublished Prescott Book (MS 277) of late 1909. Th e value of Peirce's remarks in this opening selection is that they point out which among dozens of other similar draft s and frustrated attempts could redeem the still-to-date largely unfulfi lled promise to bring together the logical, conceptual, cognitive and epistemological workings of signs. Th is "pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman", who half a century earlier had embarked on doing precisely that in his early papers, is drawn to conclude the notebook with the sentence: "Let it be admitted then that no act of thinking can involve thinking about that very act of thinking."
Are there signs that can represent themselves? And if there are, can they do that in a complete manner or do the paradoxes or self-reference and knowledge, failure of the KK-thesis, logical omniscience, implicit knowledge (unawareness), temporality of events, incompleteness, or meta-semeiotic or meta-linguistic facts of the matter thwart the enterprise? Do we for these reasons need a classifi cation that organizes signs in ranks and structures with neat subordination and elaborate inferential relations? Let the knowledgeable decide, but one thing is certain: Peirce's division of signs is full of surprises that we are only beginning to unravel.
Logic Notebook (MS 339), November 1, 1909 [360r].
2 During the last three years I have been resting from my work on the Division of Signs and have only lately -in the last week or two been turning back to it; and I fi nd my work of 1905 better than any since that time, though the latter doubtless has value and must not be passed by without consideration.
Looking over the book labelled in red "Th e Prescott Book", and also this one, I fi nd the entries in this book of "Provisional Classifi cation Namely, a good deal of my early attempts to defi ne the diff erence between Icon, Index, and Symbol, were adulterated with confusion with the distinction as to the Reference of the Dynamic Interpretant to the Sign.
Th e amount of labour still required upon the ten trichotomies of signs (and more than these ten I don't inquire into, not because I don't think they are in truth there, but simply because it will be all I possibly can do to defi ne and to prove these ten) is enough of itself to occupy the 10± years of effi cient thinking that may remain to me if no accident cuts them short.
Th e light which the two trichotomies referred to in the last paragraph but one above throws upon each other suggests a mode method of study that I have hitherto 2 Th e numbers in the square brackets refer to the Logic Notebook pagination later added to it. Editorial interventions in this diplomatic transcription are denoted by italized square brackets []. Th e title of the selection has been provided by the transcriber. employed only in getting as clear ideas as I have (and they ought to be more defi nite) of the fi rst and second trichotomies or [using the excellent notation of 1905 Oct 12 [Appendix D]] A and Ba. I am now employing applying the same method to Bbβ and Cbβ. It ought to be applied not merely to A and Ba but further to A, Ba, and Ca taken together. Also to A Ba Bbα to A Ba Cbα to Bbα Cbα. Th en to A Bβ Ccγ etc. to Ba Bbα Ccα to A Bbα Ccα etc.
[361r] A "Sign" is an Ens (i.e. something, and it may be of any category of being) which, in addition to not only has a capacity of being either imagined, perceived, or conceived, as anything of the same category of Being of which one has suffi cient happens to have enough of the right kind of dealings may be but also has the property of producing in a mind which perceives it and which has skill, or practical un through upon a person who fulfi lls in whom certain conditions are fulfi lled eff ects that another thing or a collection of other things would fulfi ll produce, those conditions being the possession by that person of a practical understanding of the system of correspondence.
But this defi nition ought to be prefaced with the remark that no know event of cognition event of learning anything brings per se any other knowledge than its content that which it has in learning; and in particular does not include any knowledge about that event of learning itself. Th us seeing does [not] include a sight of the eye or any knowledge about the learning itself. True, Hamilton and others insist that to know includes the knower's knowing that he knows; and in the limited sense in which he here used the word know, one must admit that something is true which those words seem to express. Nevertheless, merely knowing a fact does not include the knowledge that that very act per se includes any knowledge about itself, any more than seeing includes any vision of the event of sight itself. When one fi rst comes to assent to this truth that in any solid that has no hole through it nor any hole enclosed in it, the number of edges is less by two than the sum of the numbers of its distinct surfaces and of summits (supposing everyone of the former is bounded has an edge all round it by three or more edges and that every one of the latter simply extends from one summit to another), he is thinking his thought is exclusively occupied with the solid and its parts, and he is not thinking at all of himself or his knowledge. And if Hamilton does not call an assent, however unqualifi ed and confi dent, by the name of "knowledge" unless it be accompanied by a recognition of its acceptance by the knower, then it is undoubtedly true that to know is to know that one knows that which one knows, but it still remains false that to know is to know that one knows that one knows one's knowledge of the former knowing that one knows it, in the sense of actively thinking it, though one undoubtedly has what the scholastics call an habitual knowledge of it, that is to say a disposition to accept it as soon as the question occurs to the person supposed.
Let it be admitted then that no act of thinking can involve thinking about that very act of thinking. Th e Interpretant is Th reefold. Th e Normal Interpretant is the Genuine Interpretant, embracing all that the Sign could reveal concerning the Object to a suffi ciently penetrating mind, being more than any possible mind, however penetrable, could conclude from it, since there is no end to the distinct conclusions that could be drawn concerning the Object from any Sign. Th e Dynamic Interpretant is just what is drawn from the Sign by a given Individual Interpreter. Th e Immediate Interpretant is the interpretant represented, explicitly or implicitly, in the sign itself. I have thus omitted the intended interpretant. So far as the intention is betrayed in the Sign, it belongs to the immediate Interpretant. So far as it is not so betrayed, it may be the Interpretant of another sign, but it is in no sense the interpretant of that sign.
As to the Matter of the Sign itself, it is either a Tuone or a Token or a Type. Th e word ['Tuone'] is a blend of Tone and Tune. It means a quality of feeling which is signifi cant, whether it be simple, like a Tone or a complex, like a Tune. But the latter is not pure feeling. By a Token, I mean an existing thing or an actual historical event which serves as a Sign.
By a Type, I mean a general form which can be repeated indefi nitely and is in all its repetitions one and the same sign. Th us the word the is a Type. It is likely to occur over a score of times on a page of an English book; but it is only one word twenty times repeated. Th e distinction between a Type and a Token is obvious. Th ere may be some confusion between the Tuone and the Type. Th ey may, however, be distinguished in various ways. In the fi rst place, [Type] is absolutely identical in all its instances or embodiments, while a Tone cannot have any identity, it has only similarity. Th us the sound of any vowel will be slightly diff erent every two times it is pronounced and then so far as it is so, it is two Tuones. But any two vowels in so far as they are alike are the same Tuone, in the only case in which there can be any sameness to a tuone. Anything then that could conceivably be made absolutely defi nite, bearing in mind that no two things can be exactly alike in any quality whatever, cannot be a Tuone. Another test is that a Tuome [Peirce occasionally misspells Tuone as Tuome] though it may be composed of many ingredients is, like a chemical compound of many elements, perfectly homogenous and structureless in eff ect, while a Type, though it may be indecomposable, must be more or less complex in its relations. Tests might be multiplied; yet aft er all, it will oft en require subtlety to decide whether a given sign is a Tuone or a Type. Take for example a given melody, say the Last Rose of Summer. Considered as to its structure it is a Type; but considered as a whole in its esthetic eff ect which is not composed of one part due to one note and another to another, it is a Tuome. As ordinarily conceived it is a Tuone, slightly diff erent however every time, it is sure, but from the point of view of contrapoint, it is absolutely the same every time it is rendered so with substantial correctness (though it be a trifl e out of tune and time) it is a Type. But any one singing of it is neither Tuone nor Type but a Token. Notwithstanding these diffi culties in many cases there is no room for an instant's hesitation, and the distinction is not only useful but practically indispensable.
Th e immediate object of a sign may be of quite a diff erent nature from the real dynamical object. Let the object really be ever so complex, yet if it is presented without analysis, and in such a way as to have no defi nite identity, the Immediate Object is a simple quality. Th us a substantive with the indefi nite article has a simple quality for immediate object. A proper name on the contrary has a well-known existent thing for its object, even if like Othello, it be a fi ctitious object. But this cannot be the case for an interpreter who has never heard of the thing or to whom the name is new.
[278r] A sign may have for its immediate object a determining course of nature, or habit of things. Th us if I say every President of the United States has been a highminded man, I conceive that the operation of some natural law has made them so. Th is is a way in which the precise meaning may be expressed; and it is the fi rst rule of logic that in pure thought in whatever way a thing can be accurately conceived in that way it is; because pure thought has no other being than that of representing its object. Th is is not only the way the matter may be regarded but the way it must be regarded subject to an exception I shall mention presently. Th e reason it must be so regarded is that a sign cannot have two objects. You may represent a pair of things, or a triplet, etc. other collection number, but it will be a single pair, a simple triplet, or a single other collection. So the exception I alluded to is that the sentence (which is in so far ambiguous) may be taken to mean that the succession of Presidents of the U.S. (which succession is a unique object) is a succession uninterrupted of honorable men of certain sentiments. Usually as when we say "All men have two legs" we plainly refer to the nature of men, since some monstrosities reckoned as men have diff erent numbers of legs. Either a Sign is to be defi ned as something which truly represents something or else as something which professes to represent something.
APPENDIX B. Excerpts from the
[What follows are the "immediately preceding passages" in the Prescott Book.] Of the distinction between the Objects, or better the "Originals" and the Interpretant of a Sign.
By A "Sign" is meant any Ens which is determined by a single Object or set of Objects, called its Originals, all other than the Sign itself, and in its turn is, capable of determining a Mind, something called its Interpretant, and that in such a way that the Mind is thereby mediately determined to some mode of conformity to the Original or Set of Originals. Th is is particularly intended to defi ne (very imperfectly as yet) a Complete Sign. But a Complete Sign has or may have Parts which partake of the nature of their whole; but oft en in a truncated fashion.
Th e Interpretant brings a state of things to appear, either in Imagination or in Facts, or in Tendency is the infl uence exerts upon the mind, Eff ect upon the mind or Venues that the sign brings to pass, either causing a state of feeling, or an Imagination, or concentrating attention, or it may or may stimulate to action whether external, or an exertion of attention, or it may cause a state of mind of the nature of a disposition or habit.
A sign is in regard to its Interpretant in one or another of three grades of Completeness, which may be called the Barely Overt, the Overter, and the Overtest. Th e Barely Overt sign, of which a name is an example does not expressly distinguish its Original from its Interpretant, nor its reference to either from the Sign itself. Th e Overter sign of which an Assertion is an example.
Th us the Sign has a double function. First, to aff ect a mind which understands its "Grammar", or Method of Signifi cation, which signifi cation is its Substance Signifi cate or Interpretant.
Second, to indicate how to identify the conditions under which sign its signifi cate has the mode of being it is represented as having.
1909 Oct 29. A.M. 10:45. It will probably be profi table to trace out the varieties of signs of themselves. Take, fi rst, icons. A ring bearing a repeated pattern, considered as starting at any point may be an indefi nitely exact icon of itself considered as starting at any corresponding point. Yet it is necessary that these points should be individually identifi ed; and that requires that there should be something which is not copied, each as the E and S of the fi gure. Th is is true of every icon. If it were in all respects a perfect icon it would be indistinguishable from and for all intents and purposes the very same thing as its Object. It thus seems to be of the very essence of an icon that it should not be perfect; and if this be so, then unquestionably an icon may represent nothing but itself, by every part of it representing a diff erent part and there being a cycle of representations. Instead of a cycle there may be an endless sequence of representations. Th us imagine the series of all real positive rational quantities to be expressed in the order of their values as a doubly endless series of fractions in their lowest terms. Th en the whole series of their numerators may be regarded as an icon of the numerators of their doubles and those of their triples and so on and may be regarded as represented by the series of numerators of their halves their thirds etc. and so on ad infi nitum both ways and in all these their limits (which may be regarded at will as included areas excluded) remain the same.
1909 Oct 29 P.M.2:00. When the cause as appearance is so connected with a state of things as to indicate the presence of the latter it is an index of that state of things.
Th us the woman's coming out of the weather-houses is an index of moisture in the atmosphere. A purple precipitate an addition of a salt of tin is an index of the presence of gold. Th e communication of blue to starch paste is an index of the presence of free iodine etc.
So the appearance of a faint light in a particular point of the heavens as viewed through a great telescope is an index of such a light there whenever one looks there even without a telescope. Is this not an index of itself? Intensifi cation of any sensation comes under the same head.
But one of the functions of an Index is to call attention to something, as when one points a fi nger. Now is there any reason why a thing should not call attention to itself? It is true that if a sign calls attention to anything, it is in order to bring something else to attention. But it may be that that is at bottom itself, in some cases.
May not a testimony be emphatically a witness of its own truth, so that it is impossible not to believe it?
1909 Oct 30. P.M. 1:00. As for Indices, it is plain that a man may point to himself and the purpose of many an exclamation is chiefl y to call attention to itself and its neighbours in space and time of whatever description they may be.
Or say "whatever they be". [And by the way, why should not a scientifi c dialect have a special grammar, selective pronouns, prepositions, conjunctions, and perhaps even interjections.]
One incidental remark may be made here. Th e question may be asked whether a photograph is an Icon or an Iconic Index, since similarity with its object is produced by physical necessity. Now if the distinction between Icon, Index, and Symbol be, as I have defi ned it, a distinction in the relation of the Sign to its Real or Dynamical Object, then the Photograph is certainly not an Icon but is an Index, and the phrase "Iconic Index" seems to be self-contradictory. But using my terminology of 13 /3 years ago, its relation to its Actual Interpretant and still better the word (though not exactly the defi nition) that I proposed 1905 Oct 12 [Appendix D], it is an idoseme (then spelled Eidoseme). Th at is to say that it directly exhibits its signifi cation, or Dynamic Interpretant (But Qu [estion] : Is it the dynamic interpretant? It is rather the "signifi cation" or interpretant as embodied in the Real Object.)
Th at is to say, it brings up the ideas which are referred to the object by Association by Resemblance and neither by Association by Contiguity, or yet by the third mode of Association as that which is capable of accounting for the facts exhibited.
APPENDIX D. Excerpts from the Logic Notebook (MS 339)
[256r] 2. Th e dynamic object represented may be an existent represented as existing regardless of any other existence. Such a sign may be termed a Concrete.
3. A sign may have for its dynamic object a type in its mode of having as type object; that is, as existing in combining generalized existents. Such a sign may be is termed a Collective.
β. As to manner in which the sign is determined to represent the dynamical object. 1. A sign may represent its dynamical object simply by virtue of its own abstract quality. It thus represents whatever else has that quality. Such a sign is termed an Icon. Icons either represent unanalyzed qualities, when they are simple likenesses, or they have structures like the structure of the object, when is found they are analogues, or if are made for the purpose are diagrams.
2. A sign may represent its object in consequence of being connected with it in fact. Such a sign is termed an Index.
3. A sign may represent its dynamic object simply by virtue of a law, or habit, according to which it will be interpreted as representing that object. Such a sign is called a Symbol. A sign may simply seek tend to determine in the fi eld of interpretation an abstract an abstract quality like its own, simply. Such a sign may be termed an ejaculation.
2. A sign may have for its direct purpose to determine an actual event. Th e interpretant it desires may be a fact action. Such a sign may be termed an Imperative.
3. A sign may be a sign proper, i.e., have for its purpose to produce a sign immediate expressed purpose the determination in the fi eld of interpretation of a sign of its own object represented as representing itself. Such a sign may be termed a Signifi cative.
b. According to their Dynamic Interpretants. α. According to the nature of the Dynamic Interpretant in itself.
1. A sign may simply tend to extend an a vague abstract quality of its own. Such a sign may be termed an ejaculant ejaculative. Interrogative? 2. A sign may be simply strive give expression to an eff ort to produce then and there a defi nite fact, in some sort opposite responsive or complementary to itself. Such a sign may be termed a Imperative.
3. A sign may, as a sign proper, seek to determine a sign in the fi eld of interpretation. Such a sign may be termed a Signifi cative.
1905 Oct. 12 continued [259r]. b. According to their Dynamic Interpretants.
α. As to the nature of the Dynamic Interpretant in itself.
[Th e truth of the matter is that my division of the Interpretants is feeble and doesn't come out clearly nor eff ect what it should.
A sign may express a need of a {vague / defi nite {as to its nature as to the object to be aff ected A sign instead of expressing a need may be itself the establishment of assent to a regulation, that is, may be a contract.
A sign may neither express a need nor be a transaction but may simply cause the interpreter to look. Or in general to produce an eff ect. To be a carrying into eff ect upon the fi eld of interpretation According to this signs may be divided into Desiderative Eff ective Transactive 1905 Oct. 12 continued [260r]. Th e immediate interpretant is the interpretant as the sign expresses it, the interpretant that the sign of itself creates; and it is to be taken into account in the classifi cation in so far as its diff erent relations functions (?) eff ect diff erent forms of the sign. Th e dynamic interpretant is the {sign of the object / interpretant determined by the sign in a fi eld of interpretation exterior to the sign; and it has to be taken into account in so far as diff erent kinds forms of signs require diff erent kinds of {signs of the object / dynamic interpretants and also in so far as the diff erent modes [of] relations of the excited sign of the object in the exciting sign make the latter to be function as a sign.
Th e representative interpretant is what the the sign that is required to signify the professed identity or agreement of the sign with its dynamic object.
a. As to the immediate interpretant 1. It may be what is required to fulfi ll a need expressed in the sign, but which is not itself defi nitely expressed. It may be Such a sign may be termed a Desiderative
